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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of choice that does not assume completeness of the decision
maker’s preferences. The model explains in a natural way, and within a unified framework
of choice when preference-incomparable options are present, four behavioural phenomena: the
attraction effect, choice deferral, the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is per-
missible, and status quo bias. The key element in the proposed decision rule is that an individual
chooses an alternative from a menu if it is worse than no other alternative in that menu and is
also better than at least one. Utility-maximising behaviour is included as a special case when
preferences are complete. The relevance of the partial dominance idea underlying the proposed
choice procedure is illustrated with an intuitive generalisation of weakly dominated strategies
and their iterated deletion in games with vector payoffs.
∗Acknowledgements to be added.
†School of Economics & Finance, University of St Andrews. Email address: gg26@st-andrews.ac.uk.
1 Introduction
People are often faced with decision problems in which every feasible option has some-
thing superior to all others. Consumer products may have conflicting values across
different, equally relevant attributes. Election candidates may have agendas or char-
acteristics that are considered to be better in some important respects and worse
in others relative to those of the competing candidates. Policy makers may have to
choose from a set of feasible plans even when any two of them generate severe trade-
offs. When a decision maker has no clear way of resolving such trade-offs and is unable
to find a most preferred option, she could be referred to as being in decision conflict.1
Decision conflict with two alternatives is typically modelled by letting the agent’s
preferences be incomplete, in which case the alternatives can be declared incomparable.
When preferences are incomplete and a most preferred option does not exist in a
given menu, it is not clear how the agent does or should decide which option to
choose, if any, from that menu. A natural rule to consider is the one whereby she
chooses a feasible alternative that is preference-undominated. This procedure has
been extensively analysed in the literature, and as shown in Schwartz (1976) and Eliaz
and Ok (2006), among others, it could result in considerably consistent behaviour
(although obviously not a utility-maximising one).
Despite its normative appeal, this benchmark model makes predictions that are
often descriptively inaccurate. A case in point is the well-known attraction effect (Hu-
ber, Payne, and Puto, 1982) discussed below. The paper’s first contribution is the
modification of the benchmark model in a minimal way that allows for a simple expla-
nation of the above robust phenomenon. Specifically, the new model predicts that a
decision maker chooses one of the undominated feasible options that are also preferred
to at least one other feasible alternative. The addition of this partial dominance re-
quirement acts as an intuitive tie breaker that helps the decision maker choose from
the set of mutually incomparable undominated options. In menus where it is not sat-
isfied, the proposed model’s predictions coincide with those of the benchmark model
in that any feasible option may be chosen. The consistency axioms that characterise
the choice procedure are three intuitive generalisations of WARP.
Next, the model is extended in a way that establishes its robustness with respect
to the assumption that the decision maker is always able to find something to choose.
Specifically, it predicts that the agent chooses an alternative from a menu if and only
if it has the two properties mentioned above. If no feasible option satisfies both
the undomination and partial dominance criteria, the prediction is that the agent
avoids/defers choice. From a modelling point of view, the act of not choosing any-
thing is captured by a choice correspondence that takes the empty set as its value at
the relevant menus. I provide an argument of why this is a suitable modelling approach
when choice deferral is driven by incomparability (as opposed to, say, undesirability)
1This term is widely used by psychologists and consumer/marketing researchers to describe such situations. In the
philosophy of choice literature, the term “unresolved conflict” has been used synonymously by Levi (1986).
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of the alternatives. This variant of the proposed model explains the observed strength-
ening of the attraction effect in situations where people are not forced to choose (Dhar
and Simonson, 2003). Also, unlike the model’s original version where the agent’s pref-
erences are acyclic, in this version they are merely asymmetric. As a consequence,
preference cycles are now permissible and they too can cause choice avoidance by
rendering the undomination criterion impossible to satisfy for all alternatives.
The second extension builds on the expanded choice domain suggested by Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2005) which allows for studying the agent’s behaviour in decision prob-
lems that possibly include an observable status quo option. An example of a problem
with a status quo is one of an insurance policy holder who is given the chance to
change it for a different policy. Inaction here is associated with maintaining the status
quo. By contrast, when presented with the problem of choosing between the same two
policies but is not endowed with any of them, the problem is one without a status quo
and inaction is associated with choice deferral.2
In decision problems without a status quo, the second extension of the model essen-
tially coincides with the previous one, except that acyclicity of the agent’s preferences
is now restored and therefore universal incomparability in a menu is the only reason
of choice avoidance in that menu. In decision problems with a status quo on the other
hand, the modified model predicts that a feasible alternative other than the status quo
is chosen if and only if it is undominated and also dominates the status quo. As such,
it features a special, reference-dependent application of the original partial dominance
model, one where the status quo option is the specific alternative that must be domi-
nated instead of some arbitrary feasible one. The final prediction is that the status quo
option is choosable (and in fact, uniquely so) if and only if it is merely undominated.
As a consequence, this expanded model explains the phenomenon of status quo bias
(Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Knetsch, 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) along
the lines of the choice procedure that was informally discussed in Bewley (1986) and
Mandler (2004). Interestingly, it does so in a way that allows for a striking connection
between this phenomenon and the attraction effect to be made, while it also allows for
a formal distinction between status quo bias and the related but ultimately different
concept of choice deferral. To my knowledge, it is the first and so far the only model
in the literature that achieves all the above in a unified way.
A common feature shared by all three versions of the proposed model of partial
dominance, and one that they also share with the benchmark model of mere undomi-
nation, is that in decision problems where the agent’s preferences happen to be com-
plete, they all prescribe choice of the (single) most preferred feasible alternative. As
such, all models include rational choice and utility maximisation as a special case. The
precise ways in which the models’ axiomatic systems must be strengthened for them
to deliver rational choice are pinned down with three novel characterisations of such
behaviour, one that is permissive of indifference, one that is not, and a third one that
2The literature of status-quo biased choice that started with Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) has not allowed for the
possibility of deferral in problems without a status quo. This possibility will be permissible in the relevant model
below.
2
applies to problems with or without a status quo (and which rules out indifference).
The paper also attempts to answer the question of how one can recover an agent’s
true preferences by observing her choices when it is assumed to be known a priori
that she employs the partial dominance choice procedure to make decisions. A set of
conditions are given under which if an alternative is never chosen in the presence of
some other alternative, then this fact correctly reveals a preference for the latter over
the former. This revelation criterion coincides with the one proposed by Bernheim
and Rangel (2009) for the choices of bounded-rational decision makers. Finally, the
general economic relevance of the key idea in the baseline model of choice with partial
dominance is illustrated with an application on strategic choice in games with vector
payoffs. Specifically, I use the partial dominance requirement to generalise the concept
of a weakly dominated strategy in games with scalar payoffs and I draw some analogies
between the two cases and the relation between Nash equilibria and profiles that
survive iterated deletion of such strategies.
2 Choice with Partial Dominance
2.1 Preliminaries
I name the decision maker Evy. The grand set of all alternatives that Evy may be
presented with is denoted X and is assumed finite and with at least three elements.
The collection of menus of alternatives drawn from X is denotedM. For simplicity, I
assume throughout thatM includes all nonempty subsets of X (with suitable adjust-
ments all results go through without this assumption). Evy’s preferences on X are
captured by the binary relation ≻. When x ≻ y is the case it is understood that x is
preferred to y or, equivalently, that y is dispreferred to x. The notation x ⊁ y is used
if x is not preferred to y.
Evy’s choice behaviour is described by a choice correspondence C :M։ X, which
is a mapping satisfying C(A) ⊆ A for all A ∈ M. Although the literature almost
always takes nonempty-valuedness to be a defining characteristic of a choice corre-
spondence, one observes that since the empty set is a subset of every set the above
definition does not a priori restrict C to be nonempty-valued. Moreover, nonempty-
valuedness imposes the nontrivial behavioural restriction that Evy is able to find a
choosable option in every menu. In this paper I treat nonempty-valuedness as an ex-
plicit behavioral axiom (more discussion is provided below):
Decisiveness (DEC)
If A ∈M, then C(A) 6= ∅.
According to the original statement of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP) provided by Samuelson (1938) in the context of consumer demand and which
3
remains relevant in the present abstract choice framework even with DEC not a priori
assumed, if some alternative x is chosen over another alternative y in an arbitrary
menu, then y is never choosable in a menu where x is feasible:
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)
If x ∈ C(A), y ∈ A \ C(A) and x ∈ B, then y 6∈ C(B).
Since the aim of the paper is to present a model that is more descriptive than norma-
tive, WARP will be relaxed in several ways in what follows. The first is by means of
the following axiom:
ReWARP
If C({x, y}) = x and x ∈ B, then y 6∈ C(B).
Although ReWARP places fewer restrictions than WARP, one could think of the two
axioms as conveying the same normative message, namely that “if x is revealed pre-
ferred to y, then y is not choosable in the presence of x”. The difference lies in the
fact that the former does so using a narrower definition of revealed preference than
the latter. According to this line of reasoning one would think of WARP as taking
x to be revealed preferred to y if there is an arbitrary menu where x is chosen over
y, and of ReWARP as doing the same only when x is chosen over y in the binary
menu {x, y}. Choice-based inferences concerning preference between x and y are not
affected by the presence of alternatives other than x and y in the latter situation,
whereas they potentially are in the former. On these grounds one could therefore
argue that a better indication of Evy’s preference for x over y would come from know-
ing that C({x, y}) = x rather than knowing that there is some menu A where x is
choosable and y is not.3
The second weakening of WARP is presented next, which, like ReWARP, relates
behaviour in binary and non-binary menus:
DeWARP
If x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A), then y 6∈ C({x, y}).
While ReWARP predicts that choice of one alternative over another in a binary menu
will not be weakly reversed in a larger menu, DeWARP makes the opposite prediction.
Yet, although the restrictions of ReWARP are both normatively appealing and at the
same time permissive of descriptively intuitive WARP violations, those imposed by
3It is worth noting that under the DEC axiom, ReWARP is equivalent to Sen’s (1977) Property α2, which states
that if x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A, then x ∈ C({x, y}). Sen introduced this axiom as a weakening of the well-known Property
α or Contraction Consistency (see footnote 5). However, α2 is logically distinct from both WARP and ReWARP if
DEC is not assumed. By contrast, ReWARP is weaker than WARP whether DEC is assumed or not, and admits an
interpretation that is generally distinct from that of α2.
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DeWARP seem to retain primarily the normative component of WARP. Specifically, if
one accepts that x chosen over y from a non-binary menu is not necessarily indicative
of a clear preference for x over y because of the presence of other alternatives that
may influence choice, then the prediction of y not being choosable in {x, y} once such
a choice has been made is probably too strong.
When taken together, the types of consistency violations that are prevented by
ReWARP and DeWARP do not exhaust all possible WARP violations, regardless of
whether DEC holds or not. For instance, choices x = C({x, y, z}) and y = C({w, x, z})
are permissible by both axioms but not by WARP. Interestingly though, whenever
behaviour is decisive, WARP is satisfied if and only if both DeWARP and ReWARP
are satisfied.
Proposition 1
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C :M։ X:
(a) C satisfies DEC and WARP.
(b) C satisfies DEC, DeWARP and ReWARP.
(c) C is rationalized by a weak order.4
The equivalence between (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 provides a novel characteriza-
tion of utility maximization (generally with indifference) by decomposing WARP into
two distinct components in a way analogous to Sen’s (1971) decomposition of WARP
into Contraction and Expansion Consistency.5 Both these characterizations are valid
only under the assumption that DEC hods. Compared to Sen’s decomposition where
the axioms place restrictions in arbitrary menus, the one above identifies a specific
complementary relationship between the requirements for consistency from binary to
large menus and vice versa that is both necessary and sufficient for general choice con-
sistency to come about. The new characterisation can also be thought of as providing a
novel set of normative criteria relative to which the predictions of various behavioural
models of choice can be evaluated. Specifically, if a choice model leads to violations
of both Contraction and Expansion Consistency, one might be inclined to think of it
as a model of severely irrational behaviour. Such a model could, however, still con-
form with the intuitive and normatively appealing ReWARP axiom and hence retain
a non-trivial rationality element that might be suppressed if Sen’s characterisation is
the only one considered.6
The last axiom of this subsection imposes a behavioural restriction of a different
nature:
4That is, there exists a reflexive, total and transitive relation % onX such that, for all A ∈M, C(A) = {x ∈ A : x % y
for all y ∈ A}.
5Contraction Consistency: If x ∈ C(A), B ⊂ A and x ∈ B, then x ∈ C(B). Expansion Consistency: If x, y ∈ C(A),
B ⊃ A and x ∈ C(B), then y ∈ C(B).
6This is in fact the case for the model presented below.
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Choice Implies Rejection (CIR)
If |A| > 1, then C(A) ⊂ A.
CIR is weaker than the often-used “single-valuedness” assumption which renders C a
choice function. Like that assumption, however, it adheres to a strict interpretation
of the concept of choice, according to which “choosing something” coincides with
“choosing something over something else”. When Evy adopts it, then in menus with
more than one option she either chooses an alternative and rejects at least another,
or she chooses nothing. As a consequence, the only possibility where everything in a
menu is choosable under CIR is at singleton menus. Only in the case of binary menus,
however, does this axiom restrict choices to be single-(if nonempty-)valued.
As shown next, CIR and DEC together make WARP and ReWARP equivalent, and
either of these two axiomatic systems characterizes utility-maximizing behavior with
no indifference ties.
Proposition 2
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C :M։ X:
(a) C satisfies CIR, DEC and WARP.
(b) C satisfies CIR, DEC and ReWARP.
(c) C is rationalized by a strict linear order.7
Although Propositions 1 and 2 are of some independent interest, their primary
usefulness in this paper lies with the fact that they establish the precise connections
between the two modes of rational choice (i.e. with or without indifference, respec-
tively) and the behavioural model that is developed below.
2.2 The Baseline Model
This subsection borrows DEC and ReWARP from the preceding one and introduces a
few more behavioural axioms before discussing the decision rule that is jointly char-
acterized by them. The first axiom is one that relaxes DeWARP when DEC holds. In
order for the way in which it does so to be clear, it will be useful to restate DeWARP
in the following (under DEC, equivalent) way, and rename it accordingly:
Rejection Consistency (RC)
If x ∈ C(A) and C(A) ⊂ A, then C({x, y}) = x for all y ∈ A \ C(A).
Under Decisiveness, RC is the logical contrapositive of DeWARP. Without DEC, how-
ever, RC is generally stronger. Indeed, in that case one may be able to find a menu
7That is, there exists an asymmetric, total and transitive relation ≻ on X such that, for all A ∈ M, C(A) = {x ∈
A : y ⊁ x for all y ∈ A}.
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A and an alternative y in A such that C(A) ⊂ A, y ∈ A \C(A) and C({x, y}) = ∅ for
some x ∈ C(A). These choices conform with DeWARP but violate RC.
The behavioural restriction imposed by RC (which also justifies the axiom’s name)
is that every alternative that is chosen over some other one(s) in a menu should con-
tinue to be chosen over each of these rejected alternatives in the relevant binary menus.
While this restriction is normatively appealing, it essentially requires that choice of
an alternative reflects preference over every rejected alternatives. This prediction is
questionable from a descriptive point of view. It is very often the case that an alterna-
tive will be rejected even if a single feasible option can be found that is preferred to it.
Similarly, an option may be chosen even if it is preferred to some but not necessarily
all rejected alternatives. One could therefore relax RC by modifying it along these
lines:
Weak Rejection Consistency (WRC)
If x ∈ C(A) and C(A) ⊂ A, then C({x, y}) = x for some y ∈ A \ C(A).
WRC is clearly weaker than RC whether DEC holds or not. As mentioned above, when
Evy chooses x from A it is obviously more likely that this choice reflects a preference
for x over some rather than every alternative rejected in A. One also notes that while
WRC implies that every alternative that is choosable from a menu A must be chosen
over some A-rejected alternative in the relevant binary menu, the axiom allows for
some alternative to be A-rejected even if no alternative in A is chosen over it in a
binary menu.
The final weakening of WARP that is employed here is a generalization of the well-
known “Property γ” or “Expansion” axiom.8
Weak Expansion (WEXP)
If A1, . . . , Ak ∈ M are such that x = C(A1), |A1| > 1, and for i 6= 1 either x ∈ C(Ai)
or C(A′i) = ∅ for all A
′
i ⊆ Ai with x ∈ A
′
i, then x ∈ C(
⋃k
i=1Ai).
Standard “Expansion” states that if an alternative is choosable from every member
of a given collection of menus, then it is also choosable from the bigger menu that
comes about by joining all individual ones. It is implied by WARP under Decisiveness
and is generally distinct from WARP otherwise. WEXP is weaker than “Expansion”
when DEC holds and distinct from it otherwise. Indeed, for an alternative to be
choosable from the union of all menus in a given collection it is no longer sufficient
that it be merely choosable from each menu in the collection. It must also hold that
the alternative in question is uniquely chosen from at least one of these menus (and
that this menu is not the relevant singleton). When Decisiveness is not satisfied, the
latter requirement is essentially coupled by a non-rejection one. Indeed, to ensure that
8See Sen (1971) and Manzini and Mariotti (2007), respectively.
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an alternative is choosable from the union of all menus in that case, it is required that
it also be either chosen from all other menus or nothing be chosen from these menus
and each of their submenus that include the alternative. Intuitively, decision problems
where the latter happens are considered to be “neutral” when assessing the extent to
which the alternative is choosable in the expanded menu.9
The main result of this subsection characterises the proposed choice procedure in
terms of Decisiveness and three of the WARP generalisations that were introduced
above.
Proposition 3
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C :M։ X:
(a) C satisfies DEC, ReWARP, WEXP and WRC.
(b) There exists an acyclic relation ≻ on X such that, for all A ∈M,
C(A) = A ⇐⇒ x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x for all x, y ∈ A (1a)
C(A) ⊂ A ⇐⇒ C(A) =


z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x ≻ y for some y ∈ A

 (1b)
In this model Evy is portrayed as an individual who decides procedurally, yet with
a single incomplete and acyclic preference relation describing her tastes.10 Her actions
depend on whether the menu that she is presented with contains alternatives that
are preference-ranked or not. If not, then all alternatives in the menu are mutually
incomparable and, since the assumption that she always chooses something is built
in the model by means of DEC, this leads to all feasible alternatives being choosable.
This feature of the model is captured by (1a).
If, however, a preference comparison between some alternatives in the menu does
exist, then Evy proceeds in two steps. First, she elicits those options in the menu
that are undominated according to her preferences. In view of acyclicity, this set is
nonempty. Then, she searches within this smaller set of alternatives for ones that
also dominate some other feasible option(s). Since at least one preference comparison
between two alternatives exists in the menu by assumption, this set is also nonempty.
Evy’s choice is an element of this smaller set. This reasoning is captured by (1b).
9It is noted that although standard Expansion can be equivalently stated in terms of two menus (i.e. “x ∈ C(A)
and x ∈ C(B) implies x ∈ C(A ∪ B)” is equivalent to “x ∈ C(Ai) for all i ≤ k implies x ∈ C(
⋃
k
i=1
Ai)”), this is not
true of WEXP. In particular, the statement “x = C(A) and x ∈ C(B) implies x ∈ C(A∪B)” does not generally imply
the statement “x = C(A1) and x ∈ C(Ai), i 6= 1, implies x ∈ C(
⋃
k
i=1
Ai)”.
10The study of two-stage procedural choice rules that are based on distinct binary relations was pioneered by Manzini
and Mariotti (2007) and further developed by Tyson (2008), Manzini and Mariotti (2012a), Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and
Ozbay (2012), Apesteguia and Ballester (2013) and Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni (forthcoming). Although
conceptually relevant to this body of work, my model is more in line with traditional revealed preference theory in the
sense that it predicts the existence of a single preference relation with which the decision maker chooses, with no other
“shortlisting” binary relation potentially influencing her final choice.
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I will refer to both a choice correspondence C that is characterized by the axioms
of Proposition 3 and to the alternatives that are choosable according to such a corre-
spondence as partially dominant (PD). Also, if C is a PD choice correspondence and
≻ is the preference relation that is associated with it in the sense of (1), then I will
say that ≻ induces or generates C.
Similar to models of incomplete preferences where the only requirement for an
alternative to be chosen is that it be undominated,11 the ones declared choosable by
a PD choice correspondence are not preferred in general to those that are rejected.
Remarkably, however, unlike such models, this can be the case here even in menus
where C is single-valued.
Moreover, similar to the above mentioned class of models, a PD choice correspon-
dence reduces to one that is generated by utility maximization in the special case
where the generating preference relation is complete. Indeed, the situation of uni-
versal incomparability described in (1a) is ruled out from the outset in such a case,
while for every menu A, an alternative x in A satisfies (1b) if and only if it is in fact
preferred to all other alternatives in A. As known from Proposition 2, the axiomatic
system of Proposition 3 must be strengthened with the addition of the CIR axiom for
it to deliver this model of rational choice. In that case, both WRC and WEXP are
implied by CIR, DEC and ReWARP.
A feature of the PD model that is somewhat surprising at first sight is that it pre-
dicts less consistency in Evy’s cross-menu behaviour than do models of which the only
criterion for choice is undomination, even though she is actually portrayed as seeking
more reasons in the former model before considering an alternative to be choosable
from a menu. More specifically, despite the fact that Evy will never choose a domi-
nated option by following (1), her choices across menus may violate the “Contraction
Consistency” axiom, which undomination-based models obey. For example, suppose
w, x, y, z are alternatives for which w ≻ x, y ≻ z and no comparison is possible in all
other pairs derived from this four-element set. Since w and y are undominated in the
menu {w, x, y, z} and both dominate something there, C({w, x, y, z}) = {w, y}. Now
consider the menu {w, y, z}. Since w is merely undominated here, whereas y is still
both undominated and partially dominant, C({w, y, z}) = y.
Despite this “normative shortcoming”, the model is capable of explaining the well-
known attraction (or asymmetric dominance) effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1982)
in a simple way. The classic version of the attraction effect goes as follows: When two
conflicting multi-attribute alternatives x and y are feasible, both of them are equally
likely to be chosen; but when a third option z that is worse in all attributes by y
but not by x is added to the menu, y is significantly more likely to be chosen. A
deterministic interpretation of this pattern would be that both options are choosable
in the first menu, i.e. C({x, y}) = {x, y}, and only y is choosable in the expanded
menu, i.e. C({x, y, z}) = y. Since this pattern violates WARP, it readily follows that
the effect lies outside the reach of any model of rational choice. However, the model
11See Schwartz (1976) and Eliaz and Ok (2006) for some characterisations.
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that is based on mere undomination is also inadequate here, as it would pick both
x and y in menu {x, y, z}. By contrast, the predictions of the PD model coincide
with the empirical observations: Due to conflict, x and y are incomparable in the first
menu and hence either of them may be chosen, as per (1a); and although x remains
undominated in the second menu, since only y is both undominated and partially
dominant (i.e. with respect to z), this is the only choosable option here (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1:
The attraction effect
qx
qy
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
qx
qy
qz
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
C({x, y, z}) = y
The PD model, however, is general enough to also explain potential “idiosyncratic”
attraction effects that are based on more subjective dominance relations. For instance,
if Evy’s incomplete preferences differ from those captured by the usual, coordinate-
dominance partial ordering and there are alternatives x, y and z where x and y and
also x and z are incomparable while y is preferred to z, an idiosyncratic attraction
effect would occur if both x and y were choosable from the menu {x, y} and y was the
unique choosable option in the menu {x, y, z}, as also predicted by the model.
The PD choice procedure shares some features with the one proposed by Lombardi
(2009). The latter also postulates the existence of a single, acyclic and generally
incomplete preference relation, a preference-undominated element of which is chosen
by the decision maker from every menu. However, for an undominated option to be
choosable in Lombardi’s model it is required that the set of all feasible alternatives
that are dispreferred to it be not properly included in the set corresponding to some
other undominated option. This model too can explain the attraction effect, but in a
more complicated way.
Another choice procedure that accommodates the attraction effect is the one axiom-
atized by de Clippel and Eliaz (2012). This postulates the existence of two distinct
strict preference orderings, and also that the agent calculates the pair of numbers
(called “scores”) that correspond to the feasible options that are inferior to a given
alternative according to each ordering. The model predicts that the agent chooses one
of the feasible options with the greatest minimum score. Finally, the attraction effect
can also be accommodated by the model of reference-dependent choice proposed by
Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2012), which predicts that the presence of certain alterna-
tives (e.g. a decoy) in a menu restricts the set of feasible options over which the agent
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maximises a preference relation, thereby favouring the chances that some alternatives
will be chosen.
2.3 Preference Elicitation
If an outside observer somehow knows that Evy’s decision rule coincides with the one
put forward in the PD model, is it possible for the observer to elicit Evy’s underlying
preferences by looking at her choices from various menus? As discussed in Bernheim
and Rangel (2009), Manzini and Mariotti (2012a) and Rubinstein and Salant (2012)
among others, being able to answer questions of this kind is of considerable interest,
for example because they in principle provide guidance for assessing the effect that
different choices of a social planner might have for a given agent’s welfare.
If observations are available from all binary menus, then the task at hand is straight-
forward. If such observations are missing, however, it is not obvious if and under what
conditions this can be done. In this section I provide a set of conditions under which a
priori knowledge of the fact that Evy conforms to the model is sufficient for a complete
elicitation of her possibly incomplete preferences.
Consider two alternatives x, y ∈ X. For an outside observer to be able to conclude
that Evy prefers x to y it is clearly necessary that, for all menus B, if y ∈ C(B) holds,
then x 6∈ B also holds. It was argued by Bernheim and Rangel (2009) that this condi-
tion is a reasonable definition of revealed preference (in this case of x over y) and was
also shown that the associated binary relation is generally acyclic. Yet, in the case of
the PD model this condition is clearly not sufficient for accurate preference elicitation.
For instance, if X = {w, x, y, z}, x ≻ w, x ≻ z, y ≻ z and incomparability prevails
in all other pairs, then Evy’s behaviour is as follows: C({w, x, y}) = C({w, x, z}) =
C({x, y, z}) = C({w, x, y, z}) = x and C({w, y, z}) = y. Although y is never chosen
in the presence of x in this example, it is false that this reveals x to be preferred to y.
In view of the above, a question that naturally arises is whether under certain
restrictions the statement “y is never chosen over x” is true if and only if the statement
“x is preferred to y” is true. The next result identifies three such restrictions.
Proposition 4
Let N be a collection of menus that necessarily includes all those with exactly three
elements.
Let C : N ։ X be a PD choice correspondence and ≻ the (unknown) acyclic relation
that generates it. Assume that there exists some q ∈ X that is known to be ≻-
incomparable to all other elements of X.
Then, for all x, y ∈ X, statements (a) and (b) below are equivalent:
(a) x ≻ y.
(b) There is no A ∈ N such that y ∈ C(A) and x ∈ A.
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The first restriction of Proposition 4 is a domain one: Observations from all trinary
menus are available. The second restriction is that Evy’s preferences have the partic-
ular characteristic of there being at least one alternative q that cannot be compared
to anything else. The final restriction is that the outside observer is not completely
agnostic about Evy’s preferences in the sense that they know beforehand that such an
alternative q exists, and also which particular alternative that is.
The latter two restrictions are particularly demanding and limit the generality of
this result. There are cases, however, where even these restrictions can be satisfied.
For instance, when an outside observer (an experimenter, say) is interested in knowing
Evy’s preferences over the main apple varieties, they can let the grand choice set X
consist of one apple from each main variety and also include in it something that
stands a good chance of being considered incomparable to all apples, like a lettuce.
2.4 Choice Deferral and Strengthening of the Attraction Effect
Choice theorists have traditionally assumed that decision makers are able to find some-
thing to choose in every possible menu of alternatives. The PD model laid out above
is in line with this tradition. However, it is well known from introspection, casual em-
piricism and numerous experimental studies conducted primarily by psychologists and
marketing researchers (Zakay, 1984; Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Greenleaf and Lehmann,
1995; Dhar, 1997; Luce, 1998; Dhar and Simonson, 2003; Anderson, 2003) that, for a
number of reasons, people often choose nothing when faced with some menus of alter-
natives. One such reason is decision conflict, which in this paper manifests itself as
incomparability. The obvious way to model this source of choice avoidance or deferral
is to assume that in every menu where there is a complete lack of comparability the
agent chooses none of the feasible options. It is shown in this subsection that the key
idea of the PD model can be preserved even when the Decisiveness axiom is relaxed
to make deferral permissible.
More specifically, I model choice avoidance by letting Evy’s choice correspondence
be empty-valued at all relevant menus. This modelling approach is natural, yet not
very commonly adopted in the literature. Some relevant exceptions are the papers
by Hurwicz (1986) and Clark (1995).12 I presume that this hesitation is very likely
due to the argument that, since not choosing is itself a choice, a specific alternative
capturing “no choice” could be included in every menu and the choice correspondence
should then assign this option whenever it is understood that the agent avoids choos-
ing.13 This argument is perfectly reasonable in cases where avoidance is caused, say,
by the unattractiveness of the feasible alternatives. In this case the individual may
well be a utility maximizer who can compare the option of choosing nothing with all
12Gaertner and Xu (2004) use empty-valuedness to model avoidant behavior that is due to procedural aspects of
choice. Gerasimou (2012) generalizes Arrow’s (1959) model of rational choice with one that preserves WARP consistency
and at the same time allows for deferral in those (and only those) menus where a most preferred alternative does not
exist due to preference incompleteness.
13Another reason might be the perceived very close relationship between a choice correspondence and the budget
correspondence in textbook consumer theory, which is nonempty-valued by construction. It is important to keep in
mind, however, that the latter is a special case of the former.
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other options, and decide according to whether “no choice” corresponds to the highest
achievable utility level or not.14
When avoidance is exclusively due to the agent’s inability to make preference com-
parisons and all choice objects are desirable, however, I claim that this alternative
approach does a disservice. To illustrate, consider four “real” options w, x, y and z
and let also d stand for the no-choice option. Suppose the individual cannot compare
x and y and, as a consequence, avoids choosing either of them when these are the only
available options. One understands that d is chosen over both x and y here. Suppose
also that the individual prefers x to w and z, and therefore chooses x from the menu
that consists of these three options. In this case x is chosen over d. Modeled like this,
the above behavior should lead one to conclude that the decision maker is inconsis-
tent, since her choices violate WARP. In reality, however, she is simply maximizing
her preferences: She is choosing the most preferred option in the second menu, and is
cautiously avoiding choice in the absence of a preference comparison in the first menu.
Hence, the conclusion of inconsistency here is presumably unwarranted. It stems from
the fact that the no-choice option d is treated just like every other alternative, even
though when the individual actually chooses it, she doesn’t do so because it is preferred
to the other options, as is the case with avoidance caused by unattractiveness. Adopt-
ing the empty-valuedness approach eliminates this problem. With it, the question of
whether behavior is, say, WARP-rational or not is answered by checking for violations
of the axiom that occur only in menus where the individual does choose.15 Finally,
it is also worth noting that support to the “empty-set” approach towards modelling
indecision-driven choice avoidance has recently been provided also in Kreps (2012, pp.
20-21).
Coming back to the task at hand, to explain avoidant behaviour within the general
framework of the PD model it suffices to remove DEC and replace it with the (logically
distinct) CIR axiom. The following result obtains in this case:
Proposition 5
For a choice correspondence C :M։ X the following are equivalent:
(a) C satisfies CIR, ReWARP, WEXP and WRC.
(b) There exists an asymmetric relation ≻ on X such that, for all A ∈M with |A| > 1,
C(A) =


z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x ≻ y for some y ∈ A

 (2)
In this extension of the PD model Evy is portrayed as a cautious decision maker
14See Manzini and Mariotti (2012b) for a stochastic choice model of limited attention where avoidance is modelled
in this way.
15Buturak and Evren (2010) study choice avoidance in a utility-maximizing model of preference for flexibility, in
which they assume that the choice correspondence takes a specific value when the agent defers. As they exclude
deferral observations from the consistency analysis of the agent’s behaviour, their approach is essentially identical to
the empty-set approach that I am adopting in this paper (although the source of deferral is obviously different).
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who chooses nothing from a menu unless she can find a feasible option that is both
undominated and partially dominant. The fact that the relation ≻ here is merely
asymmetric and hence possibly cyclic implies that, in addition to incomparability,
inconsistency too is a potential source of deferral. Indeed, the presence of a preference
cycle causes failure to meet the undomination requirement, while, as before, in the
event of an absence of preference comparisons it is the PD condition that fails to be
met. Whether one thinks of the possibly cyclic nature of Evy’s preferences here as
a virtue or an anomaly of the model, it is worth mentioning that acyclicity of these
preferences is restored in the augmented model presented in the next section, without
this affecting in any way Evy’s ability to defer choice.
Experimental findings reported in Dhar and Simonson (2003) suggest that the at-
traction effect, as measured by the difference in the choice probabilities of the target
option before and after the introduction of an option that serves as a decoy for it,
actually becomes stronger when subjects are not forced to choose than when they
are forced to do so. This is due to the fact that many subjects choose nothing from
the pure-conflict menu where the decoy is absent and at the same time most subjects
choose the option that dominates the decoy when the latter is introduced. In the
language of the above extension, this observed strengthening of the attraction effect
can be modelled by letting the set of choosable options be empty in the first (binary)
menu, and let its value be the target option in the expanded menu. Similar to the
way in which the original attraction effect is explained by the baseline PD model in
the special case where preferences coincide with the usual partial ordering, this finding
too can be captured by the extended model in the same special case.
As shown in Proposition 2, if Evy’s choices conform with the axioms that char-
acterise this model and she is in addition decisive, then she becomes a strict utility
maximiser. Equivalently, if her preferences are complete, then choosing according
to (2) coincides with choosing the single most preferred alternative according to a
complete strict ordering.
2.5 Status Quo Bias, Choice Deferral and Partial Dominance
In this last subsection I extend the choice domain along the lines suggested by Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2005) to allow it to also include decision problems that feature an explicit,
exogenous and observable status quo.16 The motivation for this domain expansion is
that it will then be possible to apply the key idea of the PD model in a natural way
and formalize the choice procedure that was first suggested by Bewley (1986) and was
also discussed at length (but not formalised) by Mandler (2004). In Mandler’s paper,
arguments for the rationality of this procedure are made, and also for its suitability in
modelling the phenomenon of status quo bias.
Status quo bias refers to the observation that decision makers are much more likely
16See Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009) for an analysis of choice and welfare when
decisions are influenced by additional factors (called “frames” in the former work and “ancillary conditions” in the
latter), of which an example is the presence of a status quo option.
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to choose an option from a menu when that option is their status quo (or, depending
on the problem, their endowment) than when it is not (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984;
Knetsch, 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Loss aversion is one explanation for
the occurrence of the phenomenon (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
2006). Another explanation, discussed in Mandler (2004), is that people’s preferences
are generally incomplete and they choose to maintain the status quo unless they find
something preferred to it, in which case they give it up for one of these alternatives. In
view of incompleteness, the latter may not happen very frequently, hence the observed
bias. I formalise this explanation below, and obtain it as a special case of the PD
choice procedure.
Let S be the collection of all pairs (A, ⋄) and (A, s), where A is a menu inM. The
pair (A, ⋄) denotes Evy’s decision problem of choosing from A when there is no status
quo (for example, Evy chooses between three insurance policies x, y and s without
currently having one). The pair (A, s) on the other hand stands for her problem of
choosing from A when the alternative s ∈ A is her status quo (modifying the previous
example, Evy now chooses between maintaining policy s or abandoning it for x or y).
A generic decision problem will be denoted by (A, p) (i.e. when p ∈ A or p = ⋄).
A choice correspondence in this context is a mapping C : S ։ X that satisfies
C(A, p) ⊆ A for all (A, p) ∈ S. Imposing nonempty-valuedness of C for all decision
problems with a status quo is obviously necessary for ensuring conceptual relevance
and internal consistency. As above, however, C will not a priori be restricted to be
nonempty-valued in problems without a status quo.
The axioms discussed below include restatements of some of the axioms that were
introduced above as well as some novel ones.
Status-Quo Independence (SIND)
If x ∈ C(A, s) and x 6= s, then x ∈ C(A, ⋄).
The behavioral requirement imposed by SIND is that whenever Evy is faced with a
decision problem with a status quo and considers an alternative other than the status
quo to be choosable, then she should also choose that alternative when faced with the
same menu and there is no status quo. If Evy were not to abide by this axiom, she
would be exhibiting a counter-intuitive cross-decision-problem inconsistency. More-
over, in view of the evidence for status quo bias one might expect the presence of a
status quo to make it more difficult for Evy to declare choosable some other feasible
option. Once this has happened, however, one would also expect the choosability of
such an option to be maintained (if not increased) in the absence of the potentially
“gravitating” forces that a status quo option may exercise on her.
Consistent Strict Inferiority (CSI)
If C({x, s}, ⋄) = x, then C({x, s}, s) = x.
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Before discussing this axiom it is useful to first note that one natural interpretation
of the statement C({x, s}, ⋄) = x is that the agent would always choose x when faced
with the decision problem ({x, s}, ⋄). This interpretation is to be contrasted with
that corresponding to the statement C({x, s}, ⋄) = {x, s}. Moreover, together with
the absence of an alternative with the status quo property, the fact that the menu
involved in this problem is a binary one makes it natural to interpret C({x, s}, ⋄) = x
as suggestive of a strict preference of Evy for x over s. The CSI axiom then states
that if she considers s to be strictly inferior to x, she also does so when s is the status
quo.
Does the imposition of CSI alone invalidate attempts to model experimental evi-
dence suggesting that people are status quo biased? It is often the case that the bias
is observed when choice is made from menus where no alternative is objectively supe-
rior to the alternative that subsequently becomes the status quo (e.g. mugs vs candy
bars in Knetsh, 1989). In the case of a binary such menu, the observed behavior is
explainable by letting C({x, s}, ⋄) = {x, s}. CSI allows for the compatibility between
this choice and C({x, s}, s) = s, a combination that indeed corresponds to status-
quo biased behaviour. Seen in this way, the axiom can be thought of as ruling out
potentially extremely strong status quo biases that are capable of overturning strict
preference, but is absolutely permissive of such biases when the two alternatives in
question are possibly indifferent or incomparable.
Two of the axioms that were introduced in previous subsections are restated next
in a way that makes their restrictions applicable to both types of decision problems.
ReWARP*
If C({x, y}, p) = x and y ∈ C(A, p), then x 6∈ A.
CIR*
If (A, p) ∈ S is such that |A| > 1, then C(A, p) ⊂ A.
ReWARP* ensures that the kind of consistency restrictions imposed by ReWARP are
in place within any collection of decision problems with the same status quo, or without
one. Obviously, the axiom does not restrict behaviour across decision problems with
a different status quo. CIR* on the other hand extends CIR by requiring Evy never
to let herself be in a situation where she might choose anything from a menu, whether
the menu is endowed with a status quo option or not.
The remaining two of the original axioms, WEXP and WRC, are borrowed from
above without any essential modification (the only change is that A ∈ M becomes
(A, ⋄) ∈ S). Thus, restating them is redundant.
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Proposition 6
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C : S ։ X:
(a) C satisfies CIR*, CSI, ReWARP*, SIND, WEXP and WRC.
(b) There exists an acyclic relation ≻ on X such that, for all (A, p) ∈ S,
C(A, ⋄) = ∅ ⇐⇒ x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x for all x, y ∈ A (3a)
C(A, ⋄) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ C(A, ⋄) =


z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x ≻ y for some y ∈ A

 (3b)
C(A, s) 6= s ⇐⇒ C(A, s) =


z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A
x ∈ A : and
x ≻ s

 (3c)
C(A, s) = s ⇐⇒ z ⊁ s for all z ∈ A. (3d)
The first two elements of this model, (3a) and (3b), are almost identical to (1a) and
(1b) in the baseline PD model, and they dictate Evy’s behaviour in decision problems
without a status quo. The difference is that instead of considering everything to be
choosable in a menu where no preference comparison can be made, Evy here chooses
nothing from such a menu. Moreover, unlike the original deferral-permissive variant
of the model that is captured by (2), decision conflict is the only reason why deferral
takes place here, as is evident from (3a). This is due to the fact that Evy’s preferences
in the model are acyclic and therefore, unlike Proposition 5 where preferences were
merely asymmetric, deferrals here cannot occur due to a cycle. The latter two elements
of the model, (3c) and (3d), formalize the incomplete-preference-based explanation of
status quo bias that was mentioned above.
Proposition 6 provides a model that explains in a natural way, and within a unified
framework of choice with incomplete preferences, the attraction effect, deferral,17 the
strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is allowed, and status quo bias,
while it also allows for a clear distinction to be made between the related but different
phenomena of choice deferral and status quo bias. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first and so far the only model in the literature that achieves all the above simul-
taneously, and it does so without employing multiple (possibly reference-dependent)
preference relations.
The link between (3b) and (3c) in the model is of particular interest. It shows that
Evy’s decision to abandon the status quo follows a special application of the PD choice
17The model can obviously be modified so that deferral is not permissible. For that to happen, CIR* must apply
only to problems with a status quo and DEC must also be assumed. In this case, (3a) and (3b) become (1a) and (1b)
of the baseline model.
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procedure: For a feasible alternative other than the status quo to be choosable it must
be universally undominated on the one hand and partially dominant on the other, but
the latter must happen not with respect to some arbitrary feasible alternative, but
rather with respect to the status quo option. Thus, the model features a reference-
dependent, special application of the PD procedure when it comes to the decision of
giving up the status quo, and reveals a surprising connection between the potential
drivers of the two phenomena. At the same time, status quo bias is captured by the
fact that in all problems that feature a relevant status quo the latter is uniquely chosen
if and only if it is merely undominated in the menu. That is, the status quo need not
be preferred to anything else for it to be maintained.
This model too includes utility maximisation as a special case:
Proposition 7
The following are equivalent for a choice correspondence C : S ։ X:
(a) C satisfies CIR*, CSI, DEC, ReWARP* and SIND.
(b) C is rationalized by a strict linear order.
This result complements Propositions 1 and 2 by identifying the precise way in which
the axioms of the behavioural model must be strengthened to characterise rational
choice in this expanded domain.
With regard to the related literature, in addition to models of loss-aversion and
reference-dependent preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
2006) that explain status quo bias, starting with the work of Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005) an alternative approach to modelling the phenomenon has involved suitable
aggregation of multiple functions that jointly represent the agent’s preferences. Like
the one developed above, such models have typically treated the status quo as exoge-
nously given (Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005, 2012; Ortoleva, 2010; Dean, 2008). However,
in the decision rule axiomatised in Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2012) the “reference
point”, which may or may not be interpretable as a status quo, is also allowed to arise
endogenously, as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
3 Application: Iterative Dominance in Games with Vector
Payoffs
An important simplifying assumption at the heart of game theory is that the players’
payoffs can be accurately captured by a real number. This assumption is not without
limitations. For example, a firm’s choice of a pricing strategy, together with the
strategies chosen by its competitors, determines the firm’s current profits as well as
its expected discounted future profits. The firm in turn may care about both in a
way that makes it impossible for it to compare payoff vectors that generate conflict
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between present and future profits.
While the more general framework where a player’s payoffs are captured by real
vectors may add some realism to the analysis, it is also significantly less tractable
since the players’ preferences can no longer be represented by utility functions. In this
subsection I show that the concept of a weakly dominated strategy and of iterated
elimination of such strategies in standard games with scalar payoffs can be generalised
to become applicable in games with vector payoffs in a way that closely resembles
the key idea underlying the PD choice procedure. I then show by means of simple
examples that this generalised concept can be helpful in analysing games with vector
payoffs too.
A normal form vector game G is a collection {(Si), (vi)}i∈I , where I = {1, . . . , I}
is the set of players, Si is the strategy set of player i ∈ I, S =
∏I
i=1 Si and vi : S →
R
n is player i’s payoff function, with n ≥ 2. Players’ self-interestedness is ensured
by assuming that the payoff vectors are ordered by the usual, coordinate-dominance
partial ordering. For x, y ∈ Rn, write x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i ≤ n, with strict
inequality for some i, and x ≯ y when x > y is not true.
If player i has two strategies si and s
′
i such that vi(si, s−i) > vi(s
′
i, s−i) for every
s−i ∈ S−i, it is natural to think of s
′
i as being strictly dominated by si and to expect the
player never to use this strategy. Strictly dominated strategies, however, are seldom
present even in games with scalar payoffs and are even more rare in vector games. A
weaker criterion of strategy domination is therefore due.
Definition
A strategy si ∈ Si is partially dominated for player i if there exists s
′
i ∈ Si such that
vi(si, s−i) ≯ vi(s
′
i, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i
and (4)
vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i
A player’s strategy is partially dominated (p-dominated) by another strategy if it yields
a strictly lower payoff vector than the latter for some rival strategy profile, and for
no such profile does it result in a strictly higher payoff vector. One readily notes that
when n = 1 and the game reduces to one with scalar payoffs, the notion of a partially
dominated strategy does indeed coincide with that of a weakly dominated strategy. A
partially dominant strategy can be defined analogously and generalise the idea of a
weakly dominant strategy.
Similar to the case of standard games with scalar payoffs, it is of interest to study
the connection between strategy profiles that survive iterated deletion of partially
dominated strategies and Nash equilibria in vector games. The requirement of Nash
equilibrium that no player should have a profitable deviation given the strategies of
the other players has been extended in a natural way to vector games, with a profitable
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deviation defined in the above sense of coordinate-wise vector dominance. Formally, a
strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium here if for all i ∈ I, vi(s
′
i, s−i) ≯ vi(si, s−i)
holds for all s′i ∈ Si. Indeed, if s is such a strategy profile, then a deviation by
some player will either result in an unambiguously worse payoff or in a gain in some
dimension(s) and a loss in some other(s). Obviously, when n = 1 this definition reduces
to that of standard Nash equilibrium.
Just like the case of games with scalar payoffs, it is well-known that a vector game
may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.18 However, just like the case of iter-
ated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in games with scalar payoffs, iterated
elimination of partially dominated strategies in vector games can be useful for equilib-
rium selection when multiple equilibria exist. Moreover, just like the benchmark class
of games, the order of elimination is important for the strategy profiles that survive
when the process terminates. Similar also to the benchmark case, equilibria may exist
where players employ a p-dominated strategy. An example of a simple vector game
that illustrates all three points is presented below.
L R
U (0, 2), (0, 1) (0, 1), (1, 0)
D (1, 1), (0, 0) (0, 0), (0, 1)
Both (U,L) and (U,R) are equilibria in this game. Only (U,R) survives iterated
elimination of partially dominated strategies when one starts the deletion process by
removing L as p-dominated by R, and then D as dominated by U in the remaining
game. When one starts the process by deleting D as p-dominated by U , then both
(U,L) and (U,R) survive. In equilibrium (U,L), the column player plays a p-dominated
strategy.
The final point of similarity between iterated deletion of weakly dominated and p-
dominated strategies is that both processes may terminate without eliminating all non-
equilibrium profiles. An example of a vector game with this property is the following.
L C R
U (0, 2), (0, 0) (0, 1), (1, 0) (2, 1), (0, 0)
C (1, 0), (2, 1) (1, 0), (1, 1) (1, 2), (2, 1)
D (1, 1), (0, 0) (0, 0), (0, 0) (1, 2), (0, 0)
Here, D is p-dominated by U and no further elimination can be made in the game
that remains. However, at (C,C) the column player has a profitable deviation to both
L and R, and at (U,R) (s)he has a profitable deviation to C.
To further strengthen the connection between rejection of p-dominated strategies
(or choice of p-dominant strategies) in a vector game and the baseline PD procedure
18See Shapley (1959) for a set of conditions that ensure the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in zero-sum vector
games. See also Bade (2005) for an analysis of the equilibria in general games where players’ preferences are incomplete.
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of Proposition 3, define the binary relation ≻i over Si for player i by
si ≻ s
′
i ⇐⇒ vi(si, s−i) > vi(s
′
i, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i (5)
Since the relation ≻i is defined over Si and not over S, it can be thought of as a
restricted version of the player’s preferences over strategy profiles that focuses on the
player’s own strategy set. One notes that this relation is irreflexive and incomplete,
but not necessarily asymmetric. Nevertheless, cases where asymmetry is violated,
although problematic, could be treated as instances of incomparability that arise in
addition to those that come about naturally by the incompleteness of that relation.
Let Si be the collection of all non-empty subsets of Si. Player i’s choice correspon-
dence here is a mapping Ci : Si ։ Si such that C(S
G′
i ) ⊆ S
G′
i and C(S
G′
i ) 6= ∅ for all
SG
′
i ∈ Si, where S
G′
i ⊆ Si is the strategy set of player i in game G
′. This modelling
approach allows for all players to start with the original game G where their strategy
sets are Si for i ∈ I, and for these sets to “shrink” as elimination of p-dominated
strategies starts taking place.
If player i maximises the relation ≻i as in (1) to choose a strategy in a vector
game G, then by applying (1b) she will choose one of those that remain once her
p-dominated strategies have been eliminated from G. If she can eliminate no such
strategies and neither can any other player in the game, (1a) is the relevant choice
rule, and it predicts that any strategy may be chosen.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the growing literature of behavioural choice theory by
proposing and characterising a novel choice procedure that is based on a special
kind of preference maximisation which reduces to rational choice when preferences
are complete. The key element in it is the combination of the benchmark criterion of
preference undomination with that of partial preference dominance. Although the pro-
posed model is one of bounded-rational choice, the sole source of bounded rationality
is incompleteness of the decision maker’s preferences. As a consequence, in decision
problems where the agent’s preferences happen to be complete, the model predicts
utility-maximising behaviour. Three novel characterisations of rational choice are pro-
vided, in the standard domain as well as in the expanded one of Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005), which identify the precise connections between utility maximisation and the
various versions of the model.
The theoretical framework developed in this paper is able to explain in a unified
way, and with minimal deviations from the predictions of rational choice, the attraction
effect, status quo bias, choice deferral that is caused by decision conflict, and finally
the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is allowed. Moreover, the
model’s central idea was shown to be relevant for explaining status quo bias along
the lines of the incomparability-based decision rule suggested by Bewley (1986) and
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Mandler (2004), thereby establishing a surprising link between two seemingly distinct
behavioural phenomena (attraction effect vs. status quo bias) and also clarifying the
difference between related but distinct phenomena that are associated with inaction
(choice deferral vs. status quo bias).
Finally, it was shown that the model’s key idea is applicable in strategic situations
where the players’ payoffs are vectors rather than scalars. In particular, the concept of
a weakly dominated strategy in standard games was generalised to that of a partially
dominated strategy in games with vector payoffs, and some analogies were drawn
regarding the relationship between Nash equilibria and strategy profiles that survive
iterated deletion of such strategies in games with scalar and vector payoffs. Thus,
perhaps rather paradoxically, a choice model that builds on the premise that behaviour
is imperfectly rational may turn out to be (directly or indirectly) helpful in the task
of making rational predictions in the above class of very simple games that have this
additional complexity.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
It is trivial that (a) implies (b) and well-known that (c) implies (a). All that remains
is to show that (b) implies (c). Define the relation % on X by x % y if x ∈ C({x, y}).
Since all binary menus are included in M and DEC holds, % is complete. Suppose
x % y and y % z and assume to the contrary that x 6% z. Completeness implies z ≻ x,
i.e. C({x, z}) = z. By assumption, A := {x, y, z} ∈ M and C(A) 6= ∅. It follows from
ReWARP that x 6∈ C(A). Suppose y ∈ C(A). Since x ∈ A \ C(A) and y ∈ C(A), it
follows from DeWARP and DEC that C({x, y}) = y. This contradicts the postulate
x % y. Similarly, z 6∈ C(A). Thus, x, y, z 6∈ C(A), which contradicts DEC. This
establishes that x % z and therefore that % is also transitive, hence a weak order.
Now let x ∈ C(A) and suppose there exists y ∈ A such that y ≻ x. Since
C({x, y}) = y, y ∈ A and x ∈ C(A), this contradicts ReWARP. Thus, x % y for
all y ∈ A. Conversely, suppose x % y for all y ∈ A and suppose x 6∈ C(A). From DEC,
z ∈ C(A) for some x 6= z ∈ A. Since z ∈ C(A), x ∈ A \ C(A) and x ∈ C({x, z}) by
assumption, DeWARP is contradicted. Thus, % rationalizes C. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
It is obviously true that (a) implies (b) and easy to show that (c) implies (a). I
will prove that (b) implies (c). Define ≻ by x ≻ y if C({x, y}) = x. This relation
is asymmetric. Let w, z ∈ X. From the full domain assumption, DEC and CIR it
follows that C({w, z}) = w or C({w, z}) = z and therefore w ≻ z or z ≻ w. Hence,
≻ is complete. Now suppose x ≻ y and y ≻ z and assume to the contrary that x ⊁ z.
From completeness, z ≻ x. Since {x, y, z} ∈ M by assumption and C({x, y, z}) 6= ∅
from DEC, if x, y or z is in C({x, y, z}), then in view of z ≻ x, x ≻ y and y ≻ z,
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respectively, ReWARP is violated. It follows then that x ≻ z, and therefore that ≻ is
also transitive.
Suppose there exists A ∈ M with x, y ∈ C(A) for some x 6= y. Since {x, y} ∈ M
and x ≻ y or y ≻ x, this violates ReWARP. Hence, C is single-valued. Finally, let
A ∈ M and x ∈ A be such that y ⊁ x for all y ∈ A. Suppose C(A) = z 6= x. From
completeness of ≻ it follows that z ≻ x or x ≻ z. The former contradicts the postu-
lated maximality of x in A. Together with C(A) = z, the latter contradicts ReWARP.
Thus, C(A) = x. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose there exists an acyclic relation ≻ on X such that (1) holds. Let C(A) = ∅
for some A ∈M. Clearly, C(A) ⊂ A. It follows then from (1b) that there is no x ∈ A
such that (i) z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A, and (ii) x ≻ y for some y ∈ A. Since ≻ is acyclic,
there exists x ∈ A that satisfies (i). It follows then that there is no x ∈ A satisfying
(ii). These two facts in turn imply that x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x for all x, y ∈ A. But in this
case (1a) ensures that C(A) = A. Since A 6= ∅ for all A ∈ M, this is a contradiction.
Hence, DEC is satisfied.
Assume that ReWARP is violated. There exist x, y ∈ X and A ∈ M such that
C({x, y}) = x, x ∈ A and y ∈ C(A). From C({x, y}) = x and (1b) it follows that
x ≻ y. Since y ∈ C(A) it also follows from (1a) or (1b) (if C(A) = A or C(A) ⊂ A,
respectively) that x ⊁ y. This is a contradiction.
Now let A1, . . . , Ak ∈ M be such that A 6= {x}, x = C(A1) and x ∈ C(Ai),
2 ≤ i ≤ k. Define A :=
⋃k
i=1Ai. It is implied by (1b) and C(A1) = x that z ⊁ x
for all z ∈ A1 and x ≻ y for some y ∈ A1. Moreover, x ∈ C(Ai) and (1a) or (1b)
(depending on whether C(Ai) = Ai or C(Ai) ⊂ Ai, respectively) imply z ⊁ x for all
z ∈ Ai. Thus, z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A and x ≻ y for some y ∈ A. From (1b), this implies
x ∈ C(A). Hence, WEXP is satisfied.
Finally, suppose x ∈ C(A) and C(A) ⊂ A. Then (1b) implies x ≻ y and hence
C({x, y}) = x for some y ∈ A. From (1b) it also follows that y 6∈ C(A). Thus, WRC
is also satisfied.
Conversely, assume that DEC, ReWARP, WEXP and WRC hold. Define the re-
lation ≻ on X by x ≻ y if C({x, y}) = x. By definition, ≻ is asymmetric. Suppose
≻ is not acyclic. There exist x1, x2, . . . , xk ∈ X such that x1 ≻ x2 ≻ . . . ≻ xk ≻ x1.
By assumption, B := {x1, x2, . . . , xk} ∈ M, while DEC implies C(B) 6= ∅. Thus,
xi ∈ C(B) for some i ≤ k. From the ≻-cycle above it follows that there is xj ∈ B
such that xj ≻ xi, i.e. C({xi, xj}) = xj. This contradicts ReWARP.
Suppose A ∈ M is such that x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x for all x, y ∈ A. From DEC,
C(A) 6= ∅. Let x ∈ C(A) and C(A) ⊂ A. If |A| = 2, then A = {x, y} for some y ∈ X,
and x ≻ y obviously holds, a contradiction. Suppose |A| > 2. From WRC, there
exists y ∈ A \ C(A) such that x ≻ y. This is also a contradiction. It holds, therefore,
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that C(A) = A. In the other direction, let C(A) = A and suppose x ≻ y for some
x, y ∈ A. Since y ∈ C(A) by assumption, this is a violation of ReWARP. Hence, (1a)
is established.
To establish (1b), let C(A) ⊂ A for some A ∈ M. Suppose x ∈ C(A). If z ≻ x for
some z ∈ A, then ReWARP is violated. Moreover, x ∈ C(A), C(A) ⊂ A and WRC
together imply x ≻ y for some y ∈ A \ C(A). Thus, x ∈ C(A) and C(A) ⊂ A implies
z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A and x ≻ y for some y ∈ A. In the other direction, suppose there
is x ∈ A such that z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A and x ≻ y for some y ∈ A. This implies
C({x, y}) = x for some y ∈ A and, in view of DEC, x ∈ C({x, z}) for all z ∈ A. Let
F := {x, y} and label all other elements in A by z1, . . . , zk. Also, let Gi := {x, zi}.
Since x = C(F ), x ∈
⋂k
i=1C(Gi) and
⋃k
i=1Gi ∪ F = A, it follows from WEXP that
x ∈ C(A). Finally, suppose C(A) consists of all x ∈ A with the above two properties
and assume to the contrary that C(A) = A. Since there exist x, y ∈ A such that
C({x, y}) = x by assumption, while y ∈ C(A) = A is also true by assumption, Re-
WARP is violated. Hence, C(A) ⊂ A. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Since C is PD, it is trivial that (a) implies (b). For the converse implication,
suppose that for all A ∈ N such that y ∈ C(A), it holds that x 6∈ A. Con-
sider the menu {x, y, q}, which, by assumption, is in N . Since q is ≻-incomparable
to everything in X and C is PD, it follows from (1) that q ∈ C({x, y, q}) only if
C({x, y, q}) = {x, y, q}. But since x ∈ {x, y, q}, from the assumption above we know
y 6∈ C({x, y, q}). Thus, C({x, y, q}) 6= {x, y, q} and hence q 6∈ C({x, y, q}). It follows
then that C({x, y, q}) = x. The universal non-comparability of q and (1b) now imply
x ≻ y. 
Proof of Proposition 5:
The arguments in Proposition 3 establish necessity of the axioms here as well.
For the sufficiency of the axioms, recall that the relation ≻ defined as in the proof
of Proposition 3 is asymmetric by definition. Let A := {x1, . . . , xk}, k ≥ 2, where
x1, . . . , xk ∈ X. Without loss of generality suppose x1, x2 ∈ A are such that z ⊁ x1
for all z ∈ A and x1 ≻ x2. It holds that C({x1, x2}) = x1 and C({x1, xi}) 6= xi for all
2 ≤ i ≤ k. Repeated application of WEXP establishes that x1 ∈ C(A). Conversely,
consider A ∈ M, |A| > 1, and let x ∈ C(A). If z ≻ x for some z ∈ A, ReWARP is
violated. Hence, z ⊁ x for all z ∈ A. Moreover, it follows from CIR that C(A) ⊂ A
and from WRC that x ≻ y for some y ∈ A \ C(A). This establishes (2). 
Proof of Proposition 6:
It is straightforward to verify that (3) implies the axioms. For the converse, define
the (asymmetric) relation ≻ on X by x ≻ y if C({x, y}, ⋄) = x. Suppose x ≻ y,
y ≻ z and z ≻ x for some x, y, z ∈ X. Consider ({x, y, z}, x) ∈ S. By assumption,
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C({x, y, z}, x) 6= ∅. Suppose x ∈ C({x, y, z}, x). Since z ≻ x together with CSI
implies C({x, z}, x) = z, this violates ReWARP. Suppose y ∈ C({x, y, z}, x) instead.
It follows from SIND that y ∈ C({x, y, z}, ⋄) too. But since x ≻ y holds, this too
violates ReWARP. Hence, y 6∈ C({x, y, z}, x). A symmetric argument also establishes
that z 6∈ C({x, y, z}, x). It follows then that C({x, y, z}, x) = ∅, a contradiction.
Therefore, ≻ is acyclic.
Given that the axioms subsume those of Proposition 5, it follows trivially from that
result that (3b) holds for all problems (A, ⋄) in S. It also follows from Proposition 5
and acyclicity of ≻ that (3a) holds too for all (A, ⋄) ∈ S.
Now consider (A, s) ∈ S. Suppose x ∈ C(A, s) for some x 6= s. Assume to the
contrary that there exists y ∈ A such that y ≻ x. It follows from x ∈ C(A, s),
x 6= s and SIND that x ∈ C(A, ⋄). But since y ≻ x, this contradicts ReWARP. Thus,
x ∈ C(A, s) and x 6= s implies y ⊁ x for all y ∈ A. Moreover, it follows from CIR that
C({x, s}, s) ⊂ {x, s}. Suppose x = C({x, s}, s). Then, SIND implies x ∈ C({x, s}, ⋄).
Since s ⊁ x and (3b) together imply s 6∈ C({x, s}, ⋄), it follows that x = C({x, s}, ⋄),
or x ≻ s. Conversely, if C(A, s) consists of all x ∈ A such that y ⊁ x for all y ∈ A
and x ≻ s, then ReWARP ensures that C(A, s) 6= s. This establishes (3c).
To also establish (3d) suppose (A, s) ∈ S is such that y ⊁ s for all y ∈ A and
assume to the contrary that x ∈ C(A, s) for some x 6= s. It follows from above that
x ≻ s, a contradiction. Since C(A, s) 6= ∅, this implies s = C(A, s). Conversely,
suppose C(A, s) = s and let x ≻ s for some x ∈ A. CSI implies C({x, s}, s) = x.
ReWARP then also implies s 6∈ C(A, s), a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
The proof that (b) implies (a) is straightforward and omitted. For the converse,
define the (asymmetric) relation ≻ on X as in the preceding proof. It follows from
DEC and CIR that x ≻ y or y ≻ x for all x, y ∈ X. Hence, ≻ is complete. Suppose
x ≻ y, y ≻ z and x ⊁ z. Completeness implies z ≻ x, i.e. C({x, z}, ⋄) = z.
By assumption, ({x, y, z}, ⋄) ∈ Z. Moreover, DEC implies C({x, y, z}, ⋄) 6= ∅. If
C({x, y, z}, ⋄) = x, then z ≻ x violates ReWARP. The cases where C({x, y, z}, ⋄) = y
and C({x, y, z}, ⋄) = z are similarly ruled out. Thus, x ≻ z and ≻ is also transitive,
hence a strict linear order.
Consider (A, ⋄) ∈ Z. Suppose that C(A, ⋄) = x and let y be the ≻-maximal element
of ≻ in A. Assume to the contrary that x 6= y. Completeness of ≻ implies y ≻ x.
Since C(A, ⋄) = x and y ∈ A by assumption, this violates ReWARP. Thus, x = y.
Next, let (A, s) ∈ Z and define x and y as above. Consider the case where y 6= s
first. By way of contradiction, suppose x 6= y. Completeness of ≻ and the definition
of y imply y ≻ x and y ≻ s. Let x 6= s. From SIND, x = C(A, s) implies x = C(A, ⋄).
Since y ≻ x and y ∈ A by assumption, x = C(A, ⋄) violates ReWARP. Thus, x = s.
In this case, it follows from CSI and C({x, y}, ⋄) = y that C({s, y}, s) = y. Since
y ∈ A and s = x = C(A, s) by assumption, this violates ReWARP. Thus, x = y.
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Consider finally the case where y = s. Suppose x 6= y. From the definition of
y (= s) one has s ≻ x. From the definition of x one also has C(A, s) = x. Since
x 6= s = y, it follows from SIND and x = C(A, s) that x = C(A, ⋄). In view of
s ≻ x and s ∈ A, this violates ReWARP. Thus, x = y and (1) is established for all
(A, p) ∈ Z. 
Appendix B: Axiom Independence
The tightness of the axiomatic systems of Propositions 3, 5 and 6 is established here
by means of counterexamples. Straightforward modifications of these also establishes
the tightness of the axiomatic systems in Propositions 1, 2 and 7.
For the first two results, let X = {w, x, y, z} and M = {A : A 6= ∅, A ⊆ X}. Each
of the following cases provides an example where choices satisfy all but one axiom (for
brevity I ignore choice from singletons by assuming that the feasible option is always
chosen):
Proposition 3 (DEC, ReWARP, WEXP, WRC)
Not DEC:
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = C({w, z}) = ∅,
C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = ∅, C({y, z}) = y
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = {w, y}, C({w, x, z}) = w, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = {w, y}
Not ReWARP
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = {w, y}, C({w, z}) = {w, z},
C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = y
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = {w, y}, C({w, x, z}) = {w, x}, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = {w, x, y}
Not WEXP
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = {w, y}, C({w, z}) = {w, z},
C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = y
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = w, C({w, x, z}) = w, C({x, y, z}) = y
26
C(X) = w
Not WRC
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = {w, y}, C({w, z}) = {w, z},
C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = {y, z}
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = {w, y}, C({w, x, z}) = w, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = {w, y}
Proposition 5 (CIR, ReWARP, WEXP, WRC)
Not CIR
See example for “Not DEC” above.
Not ReWARP
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = C({w, z}) = ∅,
C({x, y}) = ∅, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = y
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = {w, y}, C({w, x, z}) = {w, x}, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = {w, x, y}
Not WEXP
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = C({w, z}) = ∅,
C({x, y}) = ∅, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = y
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = w, C({w, x, z}) = w, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = w
Not WRC
C({w, x}) = w, C({w, y}) = ∅, C({w, z}) = ∅,
C({x, y}) = ∅, C({x, z}) = x, C({y, z}) = ∅
C({w, x, y}) = C({w, y, z}) = {w, y}, C({w, x, z}) = w, C({x, y, z}) = y
C(X) = {w, y}
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Proposition 6 (CIR*, CSI, ReWARP*, SIND, WEXP, WRC)
Now let X = {w, x, y} and let Z be the union of the following collections of sets:
{
({w}, ⋄), ({x}, ⋄), ({y}, ⋄), ({w, x}, ⋄), ({w, y}, ⋄), ({x, y}, ⋄), ({w, x, y}, ⋄)
}
,
{
({w}, w), ({w, x}, w), ({w, y}, w), ({w, x, y}, w)
}
,
{
({x}, x), ({w, x}, x), ({x, y}, x), ({w, x, y}, x)
}
,
{
({y}, y), ({w, y}, y), ({x, y}, y), ({w, x, y}, y),
}
Not CIR*
C({w, x}, ⋄) = {w, x}, C({w, y}, ⋄) = w, C({x, y}, ⋄) = x, C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = {w, x},
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w,
C({w, x}, x) = {w, x}, C({x, y}, x) = x, C({w, x, y}, x) = w
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = w, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not ReWARP*
C({w, x}, ⋄) = C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = w, C({w, y}, ⋄) = C({x, y}, ⋄) = y
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w, C({w, y}, w) = y
C({w, x, y}, x) = x, C({w, x}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = y
C({w, y}, y) = C({x, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y.
Not CSI
C({w, x}, ⋄) = ∅, C({w, y}, ⋄) = C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = w, C({x, y}, ⋄) = x
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = w,
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({x, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y
Not SIND
C({w, x}, ⋄) = C({x, y}, ⋄) = C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = x, C({w, y}, ⋄) = ∅
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C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = x, C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = w, C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not WEXP
C({w, x}, ⋄) = C({w, y}, ⋄) = ∅, C({x, y}, ⋄) = x, C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = ∅,
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = y, C({x, y}, y) = x
Not WRC
C({w, x}, ⋄) = C({x, y}, ⋄) = ∅, C({w, x, y}, ⋄) = {w, x}, C({w, y}, ⋄) = w
C({w, x}, w) = C({w, x, y}, w) = C({w, y}, w) = w
C({w, x}, x) = C({w, x, y}, x) = C({x, y}, x) = x
C({w, y}, y) = C({w, x, y}, y) = w, C({x, y}, y) = y
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